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Dart: Constitutional Law: Free Divorce for the Indigent

CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: FREE DIVORCE FOR THE INDIGENT*
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971)
Plaintiffs, welfare recipients residing in Connecticut, applied for permission to proceed in divorce actions without payment of filing fees and costs
and submitted financial statements of indigency to support their request.
Upon denial of the application they sought a declaratory judgment in United
States district court that the Connecticut statute1 requiring payment of
costs was unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment. Additionally,
plaintiffs sought an injunction allowing them to proceed with their divorce
action without payment of fees or costs. A three-judge United States district
court dismissed the complaint.2 On appeal the United States Supreme Court
reversed and HELD, a state may not, consistent with due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment, deny access to its courts solely on the
basis of inability to pay costs when indigents in good faith seek dissolution
of their marriage.8 Justices Douglas and Brennan concurred.- Justice Black
dissented. 5
Although financial barriers to court access have been extensively discussed in legal articles 6 and surveys, 7 the instant case marks the first time
the Supreme Court has recognized the absolute right of any litigant to a
waiver of court costs and filing fees in a civil case. While it is axiomatic
that every man is entitled to his day in court," it has been assumed that
states could legitimately require compensation from persons using the courts9
to prevent frivolous litigation and to subsidize court operations.10
In the present case the Court rejected both arguments." The Court's
rationale was, essentially, that neither contention was sufficiently important
to outweigh the plaintiffs' interest in having access to the only true forum for
settling disputes. 2 In suggesting alternatives to the problems of conserving
OExrroR's NoTE: This case comment was awarded the George W. Milam Award as the
outstanding case comment submitted by a Junior Candidate in the spring 1971 quarter.
1. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §52-259 (1968).

2.

286 F. Supp. 968 (D. Conn. 1968).

3. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
4. Id. at 383, 386.
5. Id. at 389.
6. See, e.g., Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARv. L. Rxv. 361 (1923); Note,
The Poor Man in the Federal Courts, 18 STAN. L. REv. 1270 (1966).
7. See Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 558 n.67

(1967).
8. E.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US. 306, 313 (1950).
9. See, e.g., Northern Counties Inv. Trust v. Sears, 30 Ore. 388, 41 P. 931 (1895);
Harrison v. Willis, 19 Am. R. 604 (Tenn. 1871). See also Flood v. State ex rel. Homeland
Co., 95 Fla. 1003, 117 So. 385 (1928).
10. 401 U.S. 371, 381 (1971).
11. Id. at 381-82.
12. Id. at 381.
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court time and preventing capricious suits, the Court dismissed as unfounded
the assertion that there is a necessary connection between financial status
and motivation in bringing SUits. '1 3 Regarding the claim of state financial
interest in fee and cost requirements, the majority relied upon prior rulings
in the criminal law area to support its conclusion that this argument was
unavailing. It was noted that the same argument, advanced in support of a
requirement that criminal defendants pay for a transcript before being allowed an appeal, was earlier rejected.1 4
The Court indicated that this decision should be limited in its effect
to divorce proceedings.' 5 Nevertheless, it is apparent that the principles
established in the instant decision could be easily extended to other types
of litigation. To reach the desired result the majority utilized what appeared,
at least to Justice Douglas, to be a concept of substantive due process by
incorporating the idea that courts may hold a law unconstitutional when
they believe the legislature has acted improvidently.16 However, it seems
unusual that the majority would so readily ignore earlier decisions repudiating that approach.17 The Court held that Connecticut's refusal to allow
plaintiff-appellants access to its courts was analogous to denying a defendant
the opportunity to be heard and consequently violated the mandate of the
fourteenth amendment;S thus, it appears that the court relied upon procedural rather than substantive due process.
This analogy appears incomplete if confined to plaintiffs seeking divorce
actions. If the majority opinion is examined in a broader frame of reference
encompassing other types of civil actions, it would appear that any denial
of access to the courts, based solely upon financial prerequisites, is per se a
violation of due process. The concurring opinions strongly reinforce the
idea that the majority intended this result. Arguing that the case should
be decided on the basis of the equal protection clause and relying upon Griffin
v. I1linois,'9 Justice Douglas rejected the view that the problem presented
was one of due process and joined the majority in turning to the criminal law
to substantiate his conclusion. The Griffin court said: "There can be no
equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of
money he has." 20 This would seem perforce true where, as in the present
case, the individual gets no trial at all. Since Griffin, the Court has consis-

13. Id.
14. Id. at 382. See text accompanying notes 19-22 infra, for discussion of the majority's

use of criminal law rulings to substantiate its decision that fee requirements in the instant
case could not be upheld.
15.

Id.

16. Id. at 384-85. Douglas warns against the Court's adopting too subjective a standard
in determining the validity of legislative enactments. Decisions based on such a concept
are highly susceptible to the idiosyncracies of individual judges.
17. E.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963). In Ferguson the Court reaffirmed
the proposition that courts will not substitute their social and e nomi beliefs for the
judgment of legislative bodies.
18. 401 U.S. 871, 879 (1971).
19. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
20. Id. at 19.
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tently held that access to instruments needed to vindicate legal rights may
not be predicated on the defendant's financial status.2 1 While it is true that
these cases have dealt with criminal procedure, it has been recognized that
22
the provisions of the fourteenth amendment extend to civil matters.
The equal protection clause prohibits invidious discrimination based on
religion, 23 race,2 4 citizenship,

25

class, 26 or poverty. 27 The discrimination in

the instant case was based on poverty because the sole reason for appellants'
exclusion from the state courts was their indigency. To support a finding
of invidious discrimination, the state must in some way participate in the
alleged discrimination.28 In the present case the element of state action existed because the state-controlled court system provides the only means for
dissolving marriages. State control similarly exists in any civil suit.29 Further,
the indigent may be subjected to the operation of state judicial machinery by
such measures as eviction, mortage foreclosure, or chattel repossession and
because of the need for filing fees may be denied the opportunity to prevent
this action by initially bringing suit in his own right. Thus, the requirement
for filing fees bars affirmative relief to the indigent and would seem to constitute state action within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.
The rationale of the majority is difficult to assimilate if taken only in
the context of the instant case. The concurring opinion of Justice Brennan,
however, appears to state more concisely the concept that is readily inferred
from the reasoning of the majority opinion. Both the majority and Justice
Brennan agree that the indigent's interest in being heard far outweighs the
state's interest in imposing a fee, 30 but the concurring opinion went to the
heart of the matter in saying there can be no distinction between the rights
of the appellants in the present case and those of an indigent seeking the
aid of the courts in any other type of suit.31 The rationale of the majority

21. E.g., Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 42 (1967) (per curiam). See also Smith v.
Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (invalidated filing fee requirements for indigents in habeas
corpus proceedings); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (invalidated filing fee requirements for indigents in state supreme court appeals).
22. The equal protection clause extends to civil matters. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948). See also Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037, 1039 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Griffin v. Illinois, 851 U.S. 12 (1956). Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion
stated: "[I]f requiring defendants in felony cases to pay for a transcript constitutes a discriminatory denial to indigents of the right . .. available to others, why is it not a similar
denial in... civil cases?" Id. at 35.
23. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
24. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
25. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 34 U.S. 410 (1948).
26. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
27. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
28. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
29. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (state court enforcement of restrictive
covenant against Negro constituted state action within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment).
30. 401 U.S. at 380-81,387.
31. Id. at 387.
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opinion does not logically permit a differentiation between divorce and other
civil actions.
Use of the courts by indigents has been covered by statute, although
inadequately, for many years. 32 In 1967 nearly one-half the states and the
federal government had statutes permitting indigents to proceed in court
without meeting financial requirements. 3 3 These statutes, however, are seldom used 34 for various reasons.35 The decision in the instant case may increase the use of these statutes because they now become self-executing in
divorce actions and courts may thus be more inclined to invoke the use of
these statutes in other types of civil actions.
The Florida in forma pauperis statute,3 6 which applies only to plaintiffs,
provides for-a waiver of some costs. 37 The statute's weakness is that its use
is predicated upon proof by the applicant that he has an attorney willing
to represent him without charge. 38 The instant decision apparently negates,
at least in divorce actions, the prerequisite of counsel because (the Court required only that the person seeking a waiver be indigent and show good
faith.3 9 This statute has received little consideration by Florida courts 40
The legislature, however, should revise the statute to more fully effectuate
the principles established by the instant case.
The Florida constitution provides: "The courts shall be open to every
person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without
sale, denial, or delay."41 The Florida supreme court has held this to mean
only that the courts will be available for use, and not that every person will,

32. The first comprehensive in forma pauperis legislation was an English statute.
Statute of Westminster, 2 Hen. 7, c. 12 (1494).

33. Silverstein, Waiver of Court Costs and Appointment of Counsel for Poor Persons
in Civil Cases, 2 V AL.U.L. Rlrv. 21, 333-5 (1967).

34. Id. at 43. Questionnaires were sent to judges of trial courts of general jurisdiction
in all states having in forma pauperis statutes. The responses indicated that the waiver

statute was employed almost exclusively for cases arising under the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act, where the wife, if indigent, was allowed to seek judicial enforcement of a support decree without paying the usual court costs. The only other reported
uses of the waiver provision were in habeas corpus proceedings and workmen's compensation
suits.
35. Id. at 53. The primary reason for the limited use of the statutes is that the statutes
require an attorney to utilize them properly, as they are not self-executing. In addition, the
statutes have been unsuccessful due to lack of public knowledge of their existence, hostile
attitudes of judges concerning the waivers, and because of limitations in the statutes them-

selves.
36. FLA. STAT. §57.081 (1969).
37. The statute provides: "[P]overty stricken persons . . .shall receive the services of
the courts, sheriffs, clerks, and constables of the county in which they reside, without charge
.". .R STAT. §57.081 (l) (1969).
38. "Trhe affidavits [of insolvency] shall be supported by a written certificate signed by
a member of the bar of the county that he . . .intends to act as attorney for applicant
without compensation." Id.
39. 401 U.S. at 382-83.

40. See Coonts v. State, 219 So. 2d 460 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1969) (holding the statute does
not permit waiver of a security bond in replevin actions).

41. F.

CONSr. art. I, §21.
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in fact, be assured the ability to use them. 42 The Rhode Island constitution,
by comparison, contains a similar provision,43 which has been interpreted
by its supreme court as guaranteeing to indigents the right to proceed in
court without payment of costs. 44 The language of the Florida constitution,
supported by the rationale of the present case, appears broad enough to justify a similar interpretation.
The declaration of a right of free access to the courts, as is implied in the
present case, might be a signaling device to the states that the right to
counsel in civil cases is in the offing. The principle that a civil litigant may
not be deprived of an opportunity to be heard has been settled for three
quarters of a century.- It is equally certain that this right is frequently an
empty phrase if it does not include the right to counsel. 46 Although the need
for adequate representation at hearings and other judicial proceedings has
heretofore been established only in criminal cases,4 it has been asserted
that the same principle should apply to civil litigants in both state-8 and
federal courts.49
Protection of the indigent in civil litigation has long been viewed as a
secondary consideration, while the judicial system has concentrated on the
needs of the criminal defendant. The inattention accorded the civil law
indigent no doubt results largely from apprehension on the part of the
judiciary stemming from the vast reorganization required to effect the necessary changes. Nevertheless, the obstacles that were overcome in developing
adequate safeguards for indigents in criminal law can likewise be overcome
by progressive courts that are mindful of the right of the poor to be heard.50
The instant case is the initial step in fulfilling that right.
JOHN

M.

DART, JR.

42. State ex rel. Larkin v. Bird, 145 Fla. 477, 481, 199 So. 758, 760 (1941).
43. R.I. CONsr. art. I, §5: "Every person within this state ought to find a certain remedy,
by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his

person, property, or character. He ought to obtain right and justice freely and without
purchase, completely and without denial; promptly and without delay; conformably to
the laws."
44.

Lewis v. Smith, 21 R.I. 324, 43 A. 542 (1899).

45. Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897).
46. Cf. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
47. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See also Comment, Indigent Misdemeanant's Right to Appointed Counsel: Lifting the Poverty Bar- A New Florida Standard,
23 U. FLA. L. REv. 428 (1971).
48. Sandoval v. Rattikin, 395 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (Sharpe, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 901 (1966).
49. Sandoval v. Rattikin, 385 U.S. 901 (1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
50. Cf. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1850, which establishes a post-trial motion to alleviate

vast changes necessitated by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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